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Abstract
We select and execute extended task episodes (‘make tea’) as one entity and not individually execute their very many compo-
nents (find kettle, boil water, etc.). Such hierarchical execution is thought to occur in familiar task situations with pre-existing 
task episode-related scripts that once selected, control the identity and sequence of component steps. Here, in contrast, we 
show hierarchical execution of extended behavior in situations, where the identity and sequence of component steps were 
unknown and a predetermined script could not have existed. Participants performed a rule-switching task in which the rule 
to be applied on each trial could not be predicted. Crucially, they were biased into construing a recurring instance of three 
or five trials as a single task episode. Behavioral signs of hierarchical execution, identical to those seen during memorized 
task-sequence executions, were present. These included longer reaction time on the first trial of each episode that was pro-
portionate to the length of that episode, and absence of rule switch costs only between those consecutive trials that crossed 
episode boundaries. Hierarchical execution thus occurs every time the to-be-executed behavior is construed as one task 
episode, and is not limited to predictable sequences. We suggest that hierarchical execution occurs because task episodes are 
controlled and executed through goal-related entities assembled at the beginning of execution that subsume the execution 
and instantiate purposive control across time until the goal is complete.
Introduction
Goal-directed behavior frequently consists of temporally 
extended actions and task entities (task episodes, sub-epi-
sodes) that consist of a sequence of steps (e.g., sub-tasks, 
smaller acts and events etc.), but are nonetheless executed 
as one entity. The various components of checking email 
at different levels of detail (‘open browser’, ‘move cursor’, 
‘click’) or that of preparing breakfast are executed as one 
entity (e.g., Botvinick, Niv, & Barto, 2009; Dezfouli, Lin-
gawi, & Balleine, 2014; Logan, 1988). Nonetheless, how the 
sequence of acts corresponding to such task episodes consti-
tute as one cognitive entity is unclear. More so, because what 
constitutes a task is often determined by the doer’s construal 
and not by the physical environment (Vallacher & Wegner, 
1989). The same breakfast, for example, can be prepared as 
one (‘prepare breakfast’), two (‘prepare tea’ and ‘prepare 
toast’), or four task episodes (‘boil water’, ‘brew tea’, ‘toast 
bread’, and ‘spread butter’).
The experiments presented here examine the cognitive 
underpinnings of task episodes. We use the term task epi-
sodes, because these typically are temporally extended peri-
ods of focused purposive behavior during which a sequence 
of constituent steps is executed. Here, while participants 
executed continuous trials of an experimental session, task-
irrelevant cues were used to bias them towards viewing each 
recurring period of three or five trials as one task episode. 
This method allowed us to study factors related to task epi-
sodes without confounding them with factors pertaining 
to task rules, long-term memory recall, working memory, 
attention, action selection etc. While, for simplicity, we use 
the phrase ‘task episode’, we do not insist that in the task 
hierarchy, these necessarily are tasks as opposed to sub-
tasks of a larger task. Our concern is that irrespective of the 
hierarchical level, the sequence of trials be construed and 
executed as one entity.
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Hierarchical nature of actions
Almost all task and action constructs (e.g., ‘prepare break-
fast’, ‘write email’, etc.) through which we execute our 
behavior correspond to extended task episodes (see Val-
lacher & Wegner, 1987). The selection, instantiation, and 
execution of such task episodes as one entity in spite of 
their consisting of a sequence of smaller acts and pro-
cesses make our actions hierarchical. An extended epi-
sode of thought and behavior can be selected and executed 
as one unit only through a cognitive entity that can be 
selected and instantiated as one, but corresponds to or 
controls the extended episode of thought and behavior. 
Existing account of hierarchical cognition recognize the 
presence of such cognitive entities only in predictable situ-
ations, where the knowledge (both procedural and declara-
tive) related to the identity and sequence of component 
steps is accessible as a single mnemonic representational 
entity described variously as schemas, scripts, frames, 
plans (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960; Minsky, 1974; 
Norman & Shallice, 1986; Rumelhart & Norman, 1982; 
Schank & Abelson, 1977). Being related to the knowledge 
of what is to be done when in the task episode, these enti-
ties control the identity and sequence of the component 
steps much like a recipe controls the preparation of a dish. 
For example, the schema about preparing coffee may con-
sist of ‘add coffee from packet’, ‘add sugar from bowl’, 
‘add milk from carton’, each of which may have their own 
sub-schemas. The main schema remains active across time 
and sequentially selects the lower level schemas.
Execution of such predictable behavioral sequences 
generates signs of hierarchical execution. When partici-
pants recall or execute a memorized sequence of motor 
or task items (Anderson et al., 1998; Kahana & Jacobs, 
2000; Lien & Ruthruff, 2004; Rosenbaum, Kenny, & 
Derr, 1983; Schneider & Logan, 2006): (1) item 1 reac-
tion time (RT) tends to be the longest; (2) this item 1 RT 
is frequently longer for longer/more complex sequences, 
e.g., it takes longer to start speaking longer words (Klapp, 
Anderson, & Berrian, 1973), and start executing task lists 
with more item-level switches (Desrochers, Chatham, 
& Badre, 2015; Schneider & Logan, 2006); (3) when a 
sequence of more than one task item is being executed, 
then the behavioral cost of switching (or benefits of repeat-
ing) tends to be absent when component items switch (or 
repeat) across sequence boundaries (Lien & Ruthruff, 
2004; Schneider & Logan, 2006, 2015). For example, 
in a switching task that sometimes requires color judg-
ments (C) and sometimes judgments of shape (S), trials 
that require a different judgment from the previous trials 
(CS or SC) would be expected to have significantly higher 
error rates and RTs than trials that repeat the previous 
rule (CC or SS). Executing a memorized sequence like 
CCSS will result in a switch across the sequence boundary 
(CCSS–CCSS–CCSS), while executing a sequence like 
CSSC will not (CSSC–CSSC–CSSC). Despite this, accu-
racy and RT on item 1 of CCSS tend not to be higher than 
CSSC (Schneider & Logan, 2006).
These three signs of hierarchy have been interpreted as 
resulting from the dynamics of recall and instantiation of a 
hierarchical task-sequence representation (e.g., the memo-
rized sequence CCSS) in working memory that controls the 
identity and sequence of component steps (e.g., Mayr, 2009; 
Perlman, Pothos, Edwards, & Tzelgov, 2010; Schneider & 
Logan, 2006, 2015). Beginning to execute the sequence 
requires instantiating the task-sequence representation in 
working memory, hence the longer item 1 RT, and longer 
sequences take longer to instantiate causing longer item 1 
RTs for longer sequences. Control processes instantiating a 
hierarchical sequence structure in working memory have a 
hierarchical relation with the control processes related to the 
lower level task item (e.g., switch control), and hence, their 
instantiation at the beginning also suffices for switch control 
at item 1 (Schneider & Logan, 2006, 2015).
To our knowledge, these explanations have not, how-
ever, been tested in the context of task episodes that are 
unpredictable, where there can be no memory of the order in 
which different processes must be performed. This is inter-
esting, because in everyday life, many activities in which 
we engage have no fixed script; we may shop without a list 
in mind or engage in conversations the content of which 
cannot be anticipated, but, nevertheless, reliably identify 
the corresponding collection of behavior as one task (Val-
lacher & Wegner, 1987). Similarly, even apparently routine 
tasks often require much flexibility in the precise actions 
and order of actions that will be required (the cup is miss-
ing, and the tea caddy is empty). Of course, whether the 
single ‘task’ breaks down into new sub-tasks when such 
impasses are reached or whether our characterization of a 
period of behavior as a single task is merely a linguistic label 
is unclear. In this respect, the reliable presence of the signs 
highlighted above during unpredictable sequences construed 
as a single task would indicate a higher level organizing 
cognitive entity that operates despite an inability to precisely 
anticipate when given processes should be deployed. One 
possibility is that this entity may instantiate various goal-
related control processes needed for searching the unpredict-
able step and maintaining the goal directedness of cognition 
across the duration of the task episode.
Conceiving a behavioral sequence as one task episode 
is to also conceive of a goal that the episode will achieve. 
Goals conceptions are considered important for the con-
trol and execution of actions that lead to their attainment 
(Anderson, 2014; Gollwitzer & Bargh, 2005; Greenwald, 
1972; James, 1890; Jeannerod, 1988; Lewin, 1926; Meyer 
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& Kieras, 1997; Prinz, 1987). For goals to retroactively 
control the episode leading to their achievement, some 
goal-directed cognitive entity has to actively subsume the 
execution of the task episode (e.g., James, 1890; Krug-
lanski & Kopetz, 2009). Tasks and goals, therefore, may 
not just exist as declarative linguistic representations, but 
may be better understood as hierarchical cognitive enti-
ties that subsume and control cognitive processing across 
the period that culminates in their completion. Attention 
and other control processes are always instantiated in the 
context of some larger task episode to achieve some goal, 
and hence may be instantiated through the intermediation 
of such goal-directed entities. We call these subsuming 
goal-directed cognitive entities—task episode related pro-
grams. (See “General discussion” for more details).
We hypothesized that any extended sequence of abstract 
behavior if conceived as one task episode will be executed 
through a subsuming program, making the correspond-
ing cognition hierarchical. Consequently, the three signs 
that the previous studies have linked to the presence of 
hierarchical task-sequence representations will be present 
whenever a sequence of trials is construed as a task epi-
sode, even when those trials are not related to a memorized 
task-sequence representation. (1) Beginning a task episode 
will require assembling the program related to it, hence 
the high trial 1 RT. (2) Longer/more complex episodes 
require program of greater magnitude, hence higher trial 
1 RT for longer/more complex episodes. (3) Since the pro-
gram subsumes the task episode, trial-related cognitive 
configurations, associations, memory structures etc. will 
be nestled under it, a change at the higher level program 
at episode boundaries will necessarily change these lower 
level trial-related configurations, leaving no benefit/cost 
for repeating/switching a rule across consecutive trials that 
cross episode boundaries.
The presence of such episode-related programs was sug-
gested by a neuroimaging experiment (Farooqui, Mitchell, 
Thompson, & Duncan, 2012). Participants were to sequen-
tially search and detect four pre-specified letter targets while 
viewing a sequence of single letter presentations. Although 
the four target detections were identical, participants were 
instructed that the first three searches were part of one sub-
task, while the fourth one was a separate subtask. If this 
biasing was successful, participants would conceive the third 
target detection as completing a subtask episode, while the 
first and second target detections would be events lying 
within this episode that perhaps completed sub-sub-tasks 
within this subtask episode. The fourth target detection, on 
the other hand, completed the main task episode. Note that 
the sequential searches were identical and there was nothing 
structural in them that would distinguish third and fourth 
target detections from the first two, apart from their position 
in the conceived task episode. In fact, these searches could 
be equally well executed if these target detections were con-
ceived as a flat sequence of four searches.
The third target detection completing the conceived sub-
task episode elicited greater and more widespread brain 
activity compared to first and second target detections that 
occurred within that episode. In comparison, the fourth 
target completing the main task episode elicited maximal 
activity. This pattern of elicited activity: sub-subtask com-
pletion < subtask episode completion < task episode com-
pletion, could not have resulted from changes in attention, 
working memory, task rules etc., because all targets were 
identical in these terms. The most plausible account was 
that these activities reflected the conceived organization of 
the task episode and resulted from a change in cognitive 
entities related to them. Completion of a lower level epi-
sode elicited limited activity, because it only dismantled the 
program related to it leaving that related to the higher level 
episode intact. Completion of the higher level episode on the 
other hand elicited intense and widespread activity, because 
it dismantled programs at both higher and lower levels of 
hierarchy.
Current study
We predicted that to the extent an extended behavior is con-
strued as one task episode it will be executed as one cogni-
tive entity through one episode-related program, irrespective 
of the predictability of its components. The three signs of 
hierarchical cognition seen previously during the execution 
of memorized sequences will be seen whenever any arbitrary 
segment of behavior is construed as a task episode, even 
when mnemonic representations of the sequence are absent 
and the corresponding behavior is unpredictable.
Participants executed trials on which one of two items 
could be executed depending on the color of stimulus mar-
gins (blue: choose the lower value between the two numbers; 
green: choose the smaller font). The item to be executed on 
any trial was not known beforehand, and the probability of 
it being repeated or switched across successive trials was the 
same. Across different experiments a variety of means was 
used to bias subjects into conceiving a sequence of consecu-
tive trials (or a period of time in experiment 5) as a defined 
task episode. These included having to additionally count 
trials in threes (1–2–3) or fives (1–2–3–4–5; experiments 1 
and 6), temporal grouping of trials along with an irrelevant 
countdown (experiments 2, 3 and 4), and the presence of an 
irrelevant outer margin that stayed on for extended epochs 
of time and framed the execution of an extended series of 
trials (experiment 5).
If trials of such construed task episodes were executed 
through an episode-related program then (1) trial 1 RT will 
be longest because of the additional time needed to assem-
ble the program. (2) Trial 1 RT will be longer for longer 
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episodes, because the program related to the longer episode 
will take longer to assemble compared to that related to 
shorter episodes. (3) Trial rule related switch cost will be 
absent at position 1, because the dismantling and reassem-
bly of the subsuming episode-related program at the epi-
sode boundaries will refresh lower level trial rule related 
configurations.
Experiment 1
Methods
Participants were asked to keep a covert count of trials in 
threes (1–2–3–1–2–3) or fives (1–2–3–4–5–1–2–3–4–5) 
depending on an onscreen (‘steps of 3’ or ‘steps of 5’) 
instruction at the beginning of each block consisting of 6–35 
trials (Fig. 1). This instruction remained on until participants 
pressed the spacebar. On each trial two numbers differing in 
value (between 0 and 99) and font size (Arial font 60 or 20) 
were displayed on each side of the fixation cross. A margin 
box appeared around, and at the same time as, each num-
ber display. Margin color determined the rule relevant on 
that trial—blue: choose the smaller value, green: choose the 
smaller font. Participants’ decisions were conveyed via but-
tons presses that were spatially congruent with their choice 
(Numpad 1 for left and Numpad 2 for right on a standard 
QWERTY keyboard number pad). In this and all subsequent 
experiments the stimuli remained onscreen until a response 
was made. Following the response there was a fixed interval 
(iTi) of 500 ms. before the onset of the next stimulus/margin.
To encourage participants to view the 3- or 5-trial groups 
as task episodes and to check whether they were oriented to 
their stage within them, a probe (“?”) appeared at the end of 
the 6–35 trial blocks. Participants were to key in the episode 
step number that they had executed immediately before the 
probe appeared. For example, in a 3-trial episode block that 
ended after seven trials, the correct response would be 1 
(1–2–3–1–2–3–1-probe). Feedback was given on the accu-
racy of probe responses (high pitch tone for correct, low 
pitch tone for incorrect).
This and subsequent experiments were created in Visual 
Basic.net and run on a Dell computer with an 85 Hz refresh 
rate monitor situated at a comfortable distance from the par-
ticipant. The experiment was conducted on an individual 
basis in a testing room designed to minimize visual and 
Fig. 1  Trial blocks began 
with an instruction screen 
stating whether trials were to 
be counted in threes or fives. 
Subsequent trials were to be 
executed while keeping a 
covert count (e.g., steps of 3: 
1–2–3–1–2–3…). Trial rule 
was cued by the color of the 
outer margins—blue: choose the 
smaller value, green: choose the 
smaller font. The block would 
end with a ‘?’, to which partici-
pants keyed in the number of 
the step just executed. (Color 
figure online)
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noise distraction. Participants were first given seven trials 
of practice on each of the two trial types (value and font 
judgments). They then completed a 30-trial practice block 
in which the stimulus margin color, signaling the currently 
relevant rule, changed randomly. They were then told to exe-
cute trials while keeping a count in threes. They practiced on 
two such blocks before proceeding to the main experimental 
session. Participants completed 70–120 blocks each consist-
ing of 6–35 trials with 3- and 5-trial blocks being randomly 
interlaced. Participants were to respond as quickly and as 
accurately as possible.
Participants
Fifteen healthy participants (nine females) were recruited 
through MRC-CBU volunteers’ panel. Their age group in 
this and in subsequent experiments was 18–40. All gave 
written, informed consent before the experiment, and were 
paid £8.50 for their participation. All had normal or cor-
rected to normal vision.
Results
Figure 2 and Tables 1 and 2 summarize the main results. 
As is evident, these concur with the key predictions: 
(1) significantly elevated RTs to the first trial of each 
construed episode; (2) longer RTs for 5-trial than 3-trial 
episodes; and (3) lack of significant switch costs when 
switches occurred across the boundaries between epi-
sodes. The first trial of the conceived episode took long-
est to execute (Table 1, and main effect of serial posi-
tion in Table 2). Cohen’s d (effect size: mean difference/
standard deviation) was 1.68 and 1.99 for 3 and 5-trial 
episodes, respectively. This trial 1 RT was higher for 
Fig. 2  Pattern of reaction times 
across the steps of the 5- and 
3-trial episodes (continuous line 
bars: rule switch trials, dashed 
line bars: rule repeat trials). 
Note that trial 1 had the highest 
RT for both switch and repeat 
trials in both 5- and 3-trial epi-
sodes. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals calculated 
using the method suggested by 
(Loftus & Masson, 1994) for 
within subject analyses
Table 1  Mean reaction times 
(ms) and accuracies (%, bottom 
of each cell) along with their 
95% confidence intervals across 
rule switch and repeat trials of 
3- and 5-trial episodes
3-trial episodes 5-trial episodes
1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5
Switch 1014 ± 27
93 ± 1.1
938 ± 18
93 ± 0.9
902 ± 16
93 ± 1.0
1084 ± 42
95 ± 1.0
920 ± 18
93 ± 1.0
871 ± 17
94 ± 1.2
870 ± 27
93 ± 1.7
903 ± 20
94 ± 1.1
Repeat 968 ± 31
94 ± 0.8
785 ± 18
95 ± 0.5
782 ± 20
96 ± 0.9
1058 ± 50
95 ± 1.1
792 ± 19
96 ± 1.2
791 ± 28
95 ± 1.2
783 ± 19
94 ± 1.4
814 ± 23
97 ± 1.3
Table 2  Serial position: 
repeated measures ANOVA 
looking at the main effect of 
the position of trial within 
the episode on RT (and, in 
parenthesis, accuracy)
Rule switch: main effect of rule switch (switch vs repeat trials). Rule switch × serial position: interaction 
between the effects of rule switch and serial position. Serial position × episode length: effect of serial posi-
tion compared across three step and the first three trials of five step episodes
Effect dfs F MSE p
Serial position (three step) 2,28 37.9 (1.55) 196,781 (0.001) < 0.001 (0.23)
Rule switch (three step) 1,14 32.3 (9.86) 255,789 (0.11) < 0.001 (< 0.01)
Rule switch × serial position (three step) 2,28 18.7 (0.52) 22,258 (0.001) < 0.001 (0.6)
Serial position (five step) 4,56 46.9 (3.07) 317,819 (0.002) < 0.001 (0.02)
Rule switch (five step) 1,14 26.0 (12.4) 256,207 (0.012) < 0.001 (< 0.01)
Rule switch × serial position (five step) 4,56 5.7 (1.76) 9956 (0.002) 0.001 (0.15)
Episode length 1,14 2.6 (0.5) 20,059 (0) 0.13 (0.5)
Serial position × episode length 2,28 24.2 (1.5) 39,053 (0.001) < 0.001 (0.25)
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5-trial compared with 3-trial episodes [95% CI of dif-
ference = (46, 113), Table 1 and interaction between the 
effects of serial position and episode length in Table 2, 
Cohen’s d = 1.3]. While the performance on switch trials 
was poorer than on repeat trials (Table 2, main effect 
of rule switch), this effect of rule switch differed across 
the serial positions within the episode (Table 2: Rule 
Switch × Serial Position). Specifically, as predicted no 
statistically significant switch costs were observed at 
trial 1 [RT: paired t14 = 1.05, p = 0.3, 95% CI of differ-
ence = (− 19, 54); accuracy: paired t14 = 1.1, p = 0.3, 95% 
CI of difference = (− 0.02, 0.01)].
It’s noteworthy that while the elevated RTs on switch 
trials compared to repeat trials were accompanied by the 
expected reduced accuracy, the elevated RTs on trial 1 
compared with within-episode trials was, if anything, 
associated with greater accuracy. This was the case even 
though the within-episode switch cost was 92 ms, while 
the episode onset ‘cost’ (relative to within-episode trials) 
was in the region of 150–200 ms. This is to be expected, 
because response on switch trials got delayed because 
of control demands that was intrinsic to executing those 
trials, e.g., choosing the correct response in light of the 
newly relevant rule and overcoming interference from 
associations and configurations related to the previous 
rule. In contrast, trial 1 response got delayed because the 
episode-related program had to be assembled prior to 
the actual execution of trial 1, control demands related 
to choosing the correct response of trial 1 remained the 
same.
Experiment 2
In experiment 2, we replicated the basic findings of Experi-
ment 1 using a different design and tested an additional pre-
diction. If trials of a task episode are executed through one 
program assembled at trial 1 then later trials of the episode, 
i.e., trial 2 onwards, may be executed faster than identical 
trials executed as independent tasks. This is because when 
trials are executed as independent tasks they will have to be 
individually prepared for and the related program will have 
to be individually assembled before every trial. In contrast, 
when trials are executed as parts of a task episode they are 
prepared for as one unit and the related common program 
embodying these preparations assembled at trial 1. These 
preparations will not be individually made prior to every 
trial, resulting in the faster execution of later trials.
We used a different method to bias participants’ con-
ception of what constituted a task episode. Series of 3 
or 5 consecutive trials were grouped together by having 
smaller inter-trial intervals (500 ms, iTi) between them, 
while these episodes were separated from each other by 
discernibly larger durations (2 s; Fig. 3). This was fur-
ther reinforced by a faded number in the stimulus back-
ground that conveyed the number of steps left in the cur-
rent episode. The first trial of a 3-trial episode had the 
digit ‘3’ in the background, while the second trial had 
‘2’ and the third had ‘1’ (Fig. 3a). Likewise, in 5-trial 
episodes this background digit changed 5-4-3-2-1, across 
its 5 trials (Fig. 3b). Note that trials (and by extension 
the experiment) could be executed perfectly well without 
construing the series of trials as a task episode. There was 
Fig. 3  Trial rules were the same as in Experiment 1. There were three 
kinds of trial blocks. a 3-trial episodes were created by having small 
iTi within the episode and large iTi across episode boundaries. This 
was further reinforced by a faded digit in the background that went 
from 3  to 1 across the 3 trials making up the episode. b 5-trial epi-
sodes were similar to the 3 trial episodes, except that they consisted 
of 5 trials, and the faded background digit went from 5 to 1 across 
them. c Trials of the independent trial blocks were presented in a flat 
sequence with constant iTi and had the digit ‘1’ in their background 
that remained the same throughout the block. (Color figure online)
Psychological Research 
1 3
nothing structural in the design that forced participants 
to construe the 3 (or 5) consecutive trials as parts of a 
larger task episode. Apart from blocks composed of 3- 
and 5-trial episodes there was a third block type whose 
trials were not organized into episodes and were instead 
presented as one flat sequence with digit 1 in the stimulus 
background (Fig. 3c).
Methods
Stimuli and trial rules were identical to experiment 1 
(Fig. 3). Before 3- and 5-trial task episode blocks partici-
pants saw ‘3 Step Tasks’ and ‘5 Step Tasks’, respectively, 
this instruction screen remained till the spacebar was 
pressed. Before the independent trial block participants 
saw ‘Independent Trials’, and the individual trials of this 
block had the number ‘1’ in the stimulus background. The 
3- and 5-trial task blocks had 70 and 120 trials, respec-
tively, and the independent trial blocks had 70 trials. 
The order of the three block types was random. Eighteen 
participants (11 females) did a total of 85–100 blocks. 
They were not explicitly told about the temporal group-
ing of the trials in the main experiment, and were asked 
to ignore the faded number in the stimulus background.
Results
Tables 3 and 4 summarize the key results. The first trial of 
the 3- and 5-trial episodes took longest to execute (Cohen’s 
d 1.3 and 1.6; Table 3, and main effect of serial position in 
Table 4). While there was a main effect of rule switch on 
performance (main effect of rule switch in Table 4), this var-
ied across serial positions (Table 4: rule switch × serial posi-
tion). Specifically, as in the previous experiment, it was not 
significant on trial 1 [RT: paired t17 = 1.7, p = 0.1, 95% CI 
of difference = (− 8, 71); accuracy: paired t17 = 0.8, p = 0.4, 
95% CI of difference = (− 0.01, 0.02)]. Unlike the previ-
ous experiment, the trial 1 RT for 5-trial episodes was not 
higher than 3-trial episodes [95% CI of difference = (− 39, 
59); Table 4 interaction between serial position and episode 
length, Cohen’s d = 0.1]. Finally, as in the previous experi-
ment, the strong difference in RT between the first and sub-
sequent steps was not accompanied by changes in accuracy 
(Table 3, and main effect of serial position on accuracy in 
Table 4).
Trials conceived as parts of a task episode were executed 
faster than independent trials. As is evident from Table 3 the 
switch and repeat independent trials were higher than RTs 
on trials 2 and beyond of task episodes (t17 > 5.5, p < 0.001; 
Cohen’s d > 1.61). Accuracies, however, were not sig-
nificantly different. Thus, organization of trials into larger 
task episodes created a slower trial 1 but resulted in faster 
Table 3  Mean reaction times (ms) and accuracies (%, bottom of each cell) along with their 95% confidence intervals across rule switch and 
repeat trials of 3- and 5-trial episodes as well as those from the independent trial blocks
3-trial episodes 5-trial episodes Independent trials
1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5
Sw 1052 ± 33
96 ± 0.7
950 ± 17
96 ± 1.2
905 ± 32
94 ± 1.3
1048 ± 40
95 ± 0.9
951 ± 18
96 ± 1.5
940 ± 13
94 ± 1.2
979 ± 28
94 ± 1.7
952 ± 26
94 ± 1.1
1052 ± 43
95 ± 1.1
Rp 1007 ± 55
95 ± 1.3
748 ± 36
95 ± 1.0
769 ± 23
96 ± 1.2
1030 ± 46
95 ± 1.1
773 ± 20
97 ± 1.0
782 ± 20
96 ± 1.2
814 ± 15
96 ± 0.7
822 ± 25
96 ± 1.4
875 ± 40
98 ± 1.1
Table 4  Serial position: 
repeated measures ANOVA 
looking at the main effect of 
the position of trial within the 
episode on RT (and accuracy)
Rule switch: main effect of rule switch on RT (and accuracy). Rule switch × serial position: interaction 
between the effects of rule switch and serial position. Serial position × episode length: effect of serial posi-
tion compared across 3-trial and the first three trials of 5-trial episodes
Effect dfs F MSE p
Serial position (three trial) 2,34 29.6 (0.44) 419,633 (0.001) < 0.001 (0.6)
Rule switch (three trial) 1,17 43.2 (0.9) 440,396 (0.001) < 0.001 (0.3)
Rule switch × serial position (three trial) 2,34 14.2 (4.02) 55,634 (0.003) < 0.001 (0.02)
Serial position (five trial) 4,68 31.5 (1.3) 199,388 (0.001) < 0.001 (0.3)
Rule switch (five trial) 1,17 39.5 (9.4) 758,310 (0.01) < 0.001 (< 0.01)
Rule switch × serial position (five trial) 4,68 13.9 (1.4) 37,673 (0.001) < 0.001 (0.2)
Episode length 1,17 1.3 (0.02) 13,394 (0) 0.3 (0.9)
Serial position × episode length 2,34 0.324 (1.5) 1013 (0.001) 0.7 (0.25)
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execution of subsequent trials. Was the price paid at trial 1 
offset by gains at subsequent steps? We compared average 
RT and accuracy between blocks organized into task epi-
sodes with those that were not. Average RT on 3- and 5-trial 
task blocks was still significantly lower than on the inde-
pendent trial blocks (t17 > 4.1, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.82). 
This benefit also extended to switch control. Average reac-
tion time switch cost within independent trials was greater 
than that amongst trials executed as parts of task episodes 
[176 vs 128 ms; t17 = 2.1, p = 0.06, CI of difference = (− 1, 
96), Cohen’s d = 0.49].
Improved performance within task episode trials could 
have been due to the participants becoming more fatigued 
during independent trial blocks due to the absence of slightly 
longer inter-trial intervals that marked task episode bounda-
ries. To examine this we compared the initial 30 trials of 
the independent trial blocks with trials of the latter half of 
3- and 5-trial episode blocks. Participants may be expected 
to be less tired during the former (as they had only executed 
a maximum of 30 trials) than the latter (where they would 
have executed between 35 and 60 trials in 3- and 5-trial epi-
sodes, respectively). However, results were identical to the 
above and participants were still faster during task episode 
(p < 0.01, Cohen’s d = 0.87) compared to independent trials.
Another possibility may be that during independent trial 
blocks participants were executing an extended continuous 
sequence, which may have resulted in attentional breaks. 
Trials following such breaks can be expected to have very 
high RTs. In contrast, while executing task episode partici-
pants got long temporal breaks after every 3 and 5 trials dur-
ing episode blocks that could have refreshed and refocused 
their attention before the next bout of 3 or 5 trials. As per 
this account the more frequent presence of post-attentional 
break high RT trials in the continuous trial blocks may 
have increased their average RTs compared to task episode 
blocks. This explanation predicts that the RT distribution 
of independent trials should primarily differ from that of 
task episode trials in having an additional bump made of 
these high RT post-attentional break trials in the right sided 
tail of the distribution. Otherwise, other aspects of their RT 
distributions, e.g., the mode of their distributions (most fre-
quent RT values), should be identical.
To plot RT distributions we first converted individual RTs 
to z-scores. We categorized all trials into four categories on 
the basis of the rule executed (value or font) and whether 
these rules were switch or repeat from the previous trial. 
The difference of every RT from the mean of its category 
was divided by the standard deviation of that category to get 
a z-score (zRT) corresponding to that RT. The blue lines in 
Fig. 4 show the distribution of zRTs from trials 2 and beyond 
of 3- (dotted blue) and 5-trial (dashed blue) episodes. The 
black line shows the distribution from the independent trial 
block. Note that while the zRT distributions of trials from 
3- and 5-trial episodes are largely congruent, that of the 
independent trials is very different. Crucially, this differ-
ence is not limited to an additional bump in the tail of the 
distribution (corresponding to the purported post-attentional 
break very long RT trials), instead the entire distribution 
of independent trial zRTs is shifted to the right compared 
to the zRTs from within task episodes. In fact the distribu-
tion of zRTs from the independent trial blocks was largely 
congruent with those of trial 1 of 3- and 5-trial episodes 
(green plots). Hence, the above observation that trials (sub-
sequent to trial 1), construed as parts of a task episode, were 
executed faster than identical trials, executed as independent 
entities, cannot be attributed to more frequent lapses in sus-
tained attention during the independent trial blocks.
Experiment 3
Experiment 2 replicated two out of the three main results of 
experiment 1. The exception was the absence of a significant 
difference in RT at the beginning of 3- compared with 5-trial 
task episodes. One possibility is that this arose because each 
episode type was blocked, meaning that preparation for 
a task episode became somewhat routine. We examined this 
in experiment 3 using an identical design but now randomly 
interleaving 3- and 5-trial task episodes in the same blocks.
Methods
The methods here were identical to Experiment 2 with 
the exceptions that 3- and 5-trial episodes occurred ran-
domly within the same block and there was no continuous 
block condition. The experimental session lasted half an 
Fig. 4  Distribution of z-scores of RTs of trials from independent trial 
blocks (black line), trial 2 and beyond of 3- and 5-trial episodes (blue 
lines) and trial 1 of 3 and 5 trial episodes (green lines). y-axis repre-
sents the percentage of trials having a particular z-score. While more 
frequent attentional breaks during independent trial blocks would 
have predicted that the black and blue lines differ mainly in their tails 
(see text), in reality these lines differed in their entire distribution and 
not just in their tails. (Color figure online)
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hour during which participants did an average of 250 task 
episodes, which consisted of roughly equal number of 3- 
and 5-trial episodes. Twenty-two healthy participants (11 
females) participated.
Results
Tables 5 and 6 summarize the key results. Notably, the trial 
1 RT was higher for 5-trial compared to 3-trial episodes 
[Tables 5 and 6, interaction between serial position and 
episode length, 95% CI of difference = (15, 96), Cohen’s 
d = 0.6]. Other results were largely a replication of the 
previous two experiments. The first step of the conceived 
episode took longest to execute (Table 5, and main effect 
of serial position in Table 6). This was the case for both 
switch and repeat trials at trial 1. Performance on switch 
trials was poorer than on repeat trials (Table 6 main effect 
of rule switch); however, the effect of rule switch was not 
the same across the trials making up the episode (Table 6: 
rule switch × serial position). Specifically, the switch cost 
was not significant at the first position [RT: paired t21 = 0.89, 
p = 0.4, 95% CI of difference = (− 43, 109); accuracy: paired 
t21 = 0.3, p = 0.7, 95% CI of difference = (− 1.4, 1.9)]. Finally, 
accuracies were not significantly different between the trial 
1 and subsequent trials (main effect of serial position on 
accuracy in Table 6).
Experiment 4
Switch cost is caused by a change in implementation strate-
gies (e.g., change in task set, recall of new rules, over-riding 
past task-related associations/configurations etc.) between 
previous and the current acts that are conceived as differ-
ent tasks (Kiesel et al., 2010; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). In 
experiments 1–3 a sequence of task items were executed as 
parts of a larger task episode. Cognitive accompaniments 
related to individual task items were subsumed by the pro-
gram related to the overarching episode whose disman-
tling/reassembly at episode boundaries left no advantage 
of repeating (or cost of switching) a task item. In contrast 
to switch cost the congruency effect in Stroop tasks (e.g., 
identify the font color of the word RED when the font is 
blue) follows largely from the incongruence between differ-
ent stimulus dimension (e.g., word meaning and color) of 
the current trial (MacLeod, 1991; Stroop, 1935). Sequence 
effects on congruency (e.g., slower response on incongruent 
trials following congruent trials compared to incongruent 
trials following incongruent trials) are present but account 
for only a fraction of incongruence effects (Egner, 2007). If 
the absence of significant switch cost at trial 1 was related to 
the subsuming of individual trial-related cognitive configu-
rations by the episode-related program, then Stroop congru-
ence effect (hence called Stroop cost) should not be absent 
on this trial, because these largely arise from the incongru-
ence between the different stimulus dimensions of the same 
Table 5  Mean reaction times 
(ms) and accuracies (%, bottom 
of each cell) along with their 
95% confidence intervals across 
rule switch and repeat trials of 
3- and 5-trial episodes
3-trial episodes 5-trial episodes
1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5
Sw 1275 ± 68
97 ± 0.9
1125 ± 38
97 ± 0.7
1116 ± 34
97 ± 0.9
1333 ± 85
97 ± 0.7
1108 ± 28
97 ± 0.6
1112 ± 39
97 ± 0.7
1158 ± 27
97 ± 0.7
1154 ± 37
97 ± 0.8
Rp 1248 ± 73
96 ± 0.9
925 ± 45
99 ± 0.6
947 ± 38
98 ± 0.6
1300 ± 85
96 ± 1.0
904 ± 33
98 ± 0.7
934 ± 33
98 ± 0.6
977 ± 28
98 ± 0.6
990 ± 27
97 ± 0.6
Table 6  Serial position: 
repeated measures ANOVA 
looking at the main effect of 
the position of trial within the 
episode on RT (and accuracy)
Rule switch: main effect of rule switch (switch vs repeat trials). Rule switch × serial position: interaction 
between the effects of rule switch and serial position. Serial position × episode length: effect of serial posi-
tion compared across 3-trial and the first three trials of 5-trial episodes
Effect dfs F MSE p
Serial position (three step) 2,42 20 (2.9) 797,993 (14.1) < 0.001 (0.06)
Rule switch (three step) 1,21 39.7 (2.2) 577,148 (27.1) < 0.001 (0.15)
Rule switch × serial position (three step) 2,42 11.1 (2.3) 93,740 (13) < 0.001 (0.11)
Serial position (five step) 4,84 23.5 (2.5) 697,698 (9.9) < 0.001 (0.05)
Rule switch (five step) 1,21 43.1 (6.2) 1,273,614 (48.8) < 0.001 (0.02)
Rule switch × serial position (five step) 4,84 12.4 (1.9) 51,311 (7) < 0.001 (0.12)
Episode length 1,21 0.6 (0.6) 5631 (0) 0.5 (0.8)
Serial position × episode length 2,42 11.1 (0.09) 35,336 (0.39) < 0.001 (0.9)
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trial, and hence should not be affected by change in the sub-
suming program at episode boundaries.
Other accounts of hierarchy in cognition may predict a 
decrease in trial 1 Stroop cost. Koechlin, Ody, & Kounel-
her, (2003) have suggested a hierarchy of control processes, 
whereby (e.g.) episodic control determining what all control 
processes are to be instantiated in a given period subsumes 
the instantiation of trial rule-related control. Furthermore, 
these processes have a cascading relationship, e.g., the epi-
sodic control released by more anterior prefrontal regions 
goes through regions instantiating trial rule-related control 
and enhances the instantiation of this lower level control 
process. Such an account may suggest that the absence of 
trial 1 switch cost in the previous experiments was a result 
of the instantiation of episode-level control enhancing the 
instantiation of lower trial-level control (see also Schneider 
& Logan, 2006). This will predict that Stroop costs, another 
lower trial-level control demand, may also be decreased at 
the beginning of the episode.
It is also possible that Stroop cost be increased at trial 1. 
If the longer trial 1 RT was caused by a competition between 
the simultaneously active task episode  related and trial 
1 related processes for limited resources then more demand-
ing trial 1 executions like the incongruent Stroop trials will 
get additionally delayed. In contrast, in our account trial 1 
RT got delayed because the episode-related program had 
to be assembled prior to the execution of trial 1, and trial 
1 like other trials was executed through this program. The 
processes assembling it were not in competition with those 
involved in processing demands intrinsic to trial 1. Conse-
quently, our account predicts that the trial 1 Stroop cost will 
not only be present, it will be of the same magnitude as on 
subsequent trials.
Participants did a modification of color-word Stroop task 
(Fig. 6). The experiment had two kinds of blocks. Trials 
of the first one were temporally grouped into task episodes 
similar to that in Experiments 2 and 3 but in this case com-
prising four trials. To further encourage construal of these 
4-trials as task episodes, a faded background digit counted 
down to the completion of each episode (4-3-2-1). In the sec-
ond block type, trials were not organized into short task epi-
sodes and were presented as a flat sequence (iTi = 500 ms) 
with the digit ‘1’ in the stimulus background. These blocks 
allowed us to replicate the results of experiment 2 that had 
shown faster execution of trials executed as parts of a larger 
task episode than independent/continuous trials.
Methods
On each trial participants saw a centrally presented color 
word (‘Red’, ‘Blue’, ‘Green’, and ‘White’; in Arial font size 
40). The word appeared in congruent font color on 60% of 
trials and in an incongruent color on the remainder (Fig. 5). 
Participants chose the color of the print from the two color 
words presented in Arial black font size 20 below (1 degree 
away from the center and ½ degree below it) by pressing a 
button spatially congruent with their choice - left: Numpad 
1 (right index finger); right: Numpad 2 (right middle finger). 
One of the two bottom color words (allocated to left or right 
at random) always reflected the font color. When the font 
and word were incongruous, the other word always repeated 
the stimulus word. On congruous trials the other word was 
selected randomly from the remaining colors. Between these 
two options a partially (70%) transparent digit appeared in 
black. The stimuli remained on screen till a response was 
made. Erroneous responses elicited a low-pitched feedback 
tone.
At the start of 4-trial blocks the instruction screen men-
tioned ‘4—step blocks’, it remained on until the space-
bar was pressed. Such blocks consisted of 96 trials. The 
Fig. 5  Participants indicated 
the color of the print of the 
central word by pressing the 
button spatially congruent with 
one of the two color choices 
presented at the bottom of the 
screen. They were encouraged 
to construe groups of four trials 
as a single-task episode via an 
extended iTi at the end of each 
episode and by a background 
faded digit counting down the 
sequence to its completion 
(4-3-2-1). In a second block 
type trials were presented as a 
flat sequence with constant iTi 
across the block. All trials of 
such blocks had the digit ‘1’ in 
their background. (Color figure 
online)
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instruction for the independent trial block mentioned ‘inde-
pendent trials’. Such blocks consisted of 48 trials. These two 
blocks were interleaved. Eighteen participants (9 female) 
each completed 12 blocks.
Results
Tables 7 and 8 summarize the key results. As before, the 
first trial of the episode took longest to execute [Table 7, 
and main effect of serial position in Table 8, 95% CI of dif-
ference = (54, 146), Cohen’s d = 1.1]. This was the case for 
both congruent and incongruent trial 1. Expectedly, the per-
formance on incongruent trials was poorer than on congru-
ent trials (Table 8 main effect of Stroop cost), but crucially 
it did not vary across trials of the episode (Table 8: stroop 
cost × serial position). Specifically, unlike switch cost in the 
previous experiments, the cost of incongruence did not dis-
appear on trial 1 of the episode [RT: one-sample t17 = 8.8, 
p = < 0.001, 95% CI of difference = (127, 206); accuracy: 
one-sample t17 = 4.2, p ≤ 0.001, 95% CI of difference = (1.7, 
5.0)].
RTs on incongruent and congruent trials of the inde-
pendent trial blocks were higher than the incongruent and 
congruent trials of task episodes. The average RT on trials 
executed as parts of task episodes was lower than for inde-
pendent trials even when RTs of trial 1 of task episodes were 
included in comparison [congruent trials: t17 = 7, p < 0.001, 
95% CI of difference = (89, 165); incongruent trials: t17 = 4.9, 
p < 0.001, 95% CI of difference = (69, 175)]. While there was 
a general RT advantage for task episode trials, Stroop cost 
on RT (RT on incongruent trials − RT on congruent trials) 
did not differ between task episode and independent trials 
[t17 = 0.3, p = 0.8, 95% CI of difference = (− 27, 37)]. How-
ever, Stroop cost on accuracy (accuracy on Congruent tri-
als − accuracy on incongruent trials) was significantly higher 
on independent compared to task episode trials [t17 = 2.6, 
p = 0.02, 95% CI of difference = (0.5, 5.5)].
The results affirmed the general pattern of the previous 
results in showing elevated RTs on the first trial of episodes 
in the context Stroop task. They confirmed the prediction 
that Stroop cost would be present on trial 1 and have the 
same value as on other trials of the episode. They also rep-
licated the findings of experiment 2 that trials executed as 
parts of a task episode got executed faster and better con-
trolled than trials executed as independent tasks.
Experiment 5
Counting or countdowns involved in prior experiments could 
be construed as hierarchical acts, and it is possible that the 
hierarchy evident in the execution of trials in experiments 
1–4 was a spillover from a separate but simultaneous hierar-
chical task—counting (or countdown) in 3, 5 or 4s. Through 
this experiment we clarify that this was not the case, the 
above observations resulted from the construal of the trial 
series as one task episode.
The task episodes of the current experiment did not have 
a fixed number of trials and did not involve counting or 
countdown. Instead the notion of episodes was created by 
the presence of an additional margin (outside the one con-
veying the relevant trial rule) that stayed on for an extended 
duration during which trials would appear randomly at any 
time. Trials would not appear after this margin had switched 
off. Every episode began with the appearance of trial 1 stim-
ulus along with this margin (Fig. 6). While the trial 1 stimuli 
disappeared after the response, the outer margin remained 
on, and subsequent trials would appear anytime, while this 
outer margin was on. This margin went off at the end of the 
episode, and came back on with the beginning of the next 
Table 7  Mean reaction times 
(ms) and accuracies (%) across 
the incongruent and congruent 
trials corresponding to the four 
steps of task episode and of 
independent trial blocks
1 2 3 4 Independent trials
Incongruent 1104 ± 43
96 ± 1.4
991 ± 28
94 ± 1.1
995 ± 25
94 ± 1.1
986 ± 28
94 ± 1.3
1141 ± 38
92 ± 1.4
Congruent 938 ± 30
99 ± 0.4
843 ± 20
99 ± 0.3
862 ± 19
99 ± 0.2
848 ± 23
99 ± 0.3
1000 ± 38
99 ± 0.4
Table 8  Serial Position: 
Repeated measures ANOVA 
looking at the main effect of 
the position of trial within the 
episode on RT (and accuracy, in 
parenthesis)
Stroop cost: main effect of congruence (incongruent vs congruent trials). Stroop cost × serial position: 
interaction between the effects of congruence and serial position
Effect dfs F MSE p
Serial position (four step) 3,51 18.3 (1.8) 90,838 (1821) < 0.001 (0.2)
Stroop cost (four step) 1,17 92.1 (87.9) 769,757 (726,102) < 0.001 (0.3)
Stroop cost × serial position 
(four step)
3,51 2.1 (2.4) 1965 (2115) 0.1 (0.08)
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episode. The notion of task episode was thus implicitly con-
veyed as the period enveloped by the presence of the outer 
margin. Participants were not instructed about the episodic 
structure of the task block and were told nothing about the 
outermost margins.
Two kinds of episodes (short and long), framed by differ-
ent color margins (black or red), were randomly interleaved. 
Short episodes lasted between 3 and 6 s during which two 
to three trials could appear. Long episodes lasted between 
7 and 10 s during which three to seven trials could appear. 
The inter-episode interval was fixed at 2 s, but the iTi within 
an episode varied from 50 ms to 5 s in short episodes and 
50 ms to 3 s in long episodes. Note that in this experiment, 
not only did the subjects not have any foreknowledge about 
the identity and sequence of task items, they also could not 
predict the number of trials and their iTis. In addition, note 
that this design created greater uncertainty about the timing 
of later trials compared to trial 1. While the timing of trial 
1 was fixed at 2 s after the last offset of the outer (episode-
related) margin, subsequent trials could occur anywhere 
from 50 ms to 5 s after the previous trial. This uncertainty is 
likely to slower the RT of later trials, especially if preceded 
by very long iTis (Gopher, Armony, & Greenshpan, 2000). 
The presence of signs of task episodes in the face of the very 
implicit nature of current task episodes and the uncertainty 
associated with individual trials would testify to the perva-
siveness and strength of the cognitive tendency to recognize 
and utilize the episodic organization of the task at hand for 
the execution of behavior.
Methods
Apart from the additional outer margin, individual trials 
were identical to Experiments 1–3 (speeded decision as to 
which of the two numbers had the smaller value or font size 
as indicated by the color of the inner margin). 27 participants 
(17 females) did two experimental sessions each lasting 
16 min, with a period of rest in between. Within a session 
the two kinds of conceived episodes occurred randomly.
Results
Key results of the previous experiments were again rep-
licated (Tables 9, 10). The first trial of the episode took 
Fig. 6  Outermost margin (here 
in red) remained onscreen for an 
extended duration during which 
an unpredictable number of 
trials would appear at random 
intervals. Trials would not 
appear when this margin was 
off. We hoped that participants 
would construe the temporal 
epochs carved by the presence 
of such margins as the recur-
ring task episodic units to be 
executed. (Color figure online)
Table 9  Mean reaction times (ms) and accuracies (%) across the switch and repeat trials of short and long episodes
Short Long
1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Sw 873 ± 16
94 ± 1.5
876 ± 11
94 ± 1.3
876 ± 14
92 ± 1.2
898 ± 24
92 ± 16
853 ± 17
92 ± 16
883 ± 19
94 ± 16
867 ± 21
94 ± 16
874 ± 16
92 ± 16
851 ± 17
93 ± 16
886 ± 19
92 ± 16
Rp 843 ± 24
95 ± 1.0
723 ± 16
97 ± 1.0
751 ± 22
97 ± 0.9
856 ± 18
94 ± 1.2
723 ± 15
96 ± 2
722 ± 17
97 ± 1.2
741 ± 13
95 ± 1.8
755 ± 15
95 ± 2.2
775 ± 13
95 ± 1.7
746 ± 10
97 ± 1.5
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longest to execute (F2,52 = 28.1, p < 0.001). This trial 1 
RT was longer before longer episodes [95% CI of dif-
ference = (14, 39), Cohen’s d = 0.81; t26 = 4.2, p < 0.001]. 
Switch cost was substantially reduced at the first trial 
of the episode (Smaller episodes: F2,52 = 18; Longer 
episodes: F6,156 = 8.1, p < 0.001 for both). The execu-
tion of trials construed as parts of a larger task episode 
again showed key behavioral signatures that suggested 
that these trials were executed not as independent enti-
ties but through a common program. This was the case 
even though participants were unaware of the number 
and sequence of task items they would execute as well 
as when those items would be executed and the precise 
duration of the episode.
Note that the trial 1 RT in this experiment was delayed 
by only 64 ms compared to subsequent trial RTs. In com-
parison, in experiments 1 to 3 this was 175–250 ms. This 
is likely to be due to greater uncertainty related to the 
timings of later trials compared to trial 1. While trial 1 
would predictably occur 2 s from the offset of the previ-
ous task episode margin, subsequent trials would appear 
variably between 50 ms to 5 s after the previous trial. This 
can be expected to decrease trial 1 RT while increasing 
RTs on subsequent trials (Table 9).
Experiment 6
In this experiment, we investigated two questions. First, is 
the higher trial 1 RT during 5-trial episodes compared to 
3-trial episodes caused by their greater number of trials or 
their greater temporal duration? Second, is the difference in 
RTs between longer and shorter episodes limited to trial 1? 
Through the first question we investigated if the magnitude 
of the subsuming program is also related to the temporal 
duration of the episode, and through the second, whether 
maintaining the program impinged upon the limited cogni-
tive reserves available for trial execution.
The first question could not be answered by the previous 
experiments because episodes longer in duration also had 
greater number of trials. To the second question experi-
ments 1–5 gave a null result. While trial 1 RT was longer 
before longer episodes, RTs on subsequent trials were not 
different between longer and shorter episodes. Hence in all 
these experiments only the interaction between the effects 
of serial position with episode length was significant but the 
main effect of episode length was not (Tables 2, 4, 6, 10). 
Maintaining the larger program did not seem decrease the 
availability of limited capacity reserves for trial execution. 
However, it is possible that this absence of evidence was 
the result of the passive nature of task episodes in these 
experiments. Participants were merely biased to construe 
the set of trials as an episode and did not have to actively 
do something with the task episode. Hence, the difference 
in the magnitude of the program between 5 and 3 trial epi-
sodes may not have been large enough to cause discernible 
depletion of cognitive reserves available for component trial 
execution.
In the current experiment task episodes had to be actively 
executed. Participants had to keep an active count of trials 
they had executed and press a ‘task end’ button at the end of 
each episode made of 3 or 5 trials. Trials were identical to 
those in experiments 1–3. They were executed in three dif-
ferent kinds of task episodes—3-trial-short, 5-trial-short and 
3-trial-long (Fig. 7). In the first two there was no iTi within 
an episode and the next stimulus ensued immediately after 
response of the previous trial, whereas in the third (i.e., the 
3-trial-long episodes) the iTi was 2 s. Inter-episode interval 
was 2 s in all task episode blocks. Hence, trial 1 of all three 
task episodes were preceded by the same iTi.
We made two predictions. First, if the program subsumes 
and organizes cognitive processing during the entire task 
episode then its magnitude may be related not just to the 
number of component trials but also to the temporal dura-
tion of the task episode. Trial 1 RT of 3-trial-long episodes 
may, therefore, be slower than those of 3-trial-short episodes 
Table 10  Serial position: 
repeated measures ANOVA 
looking at the main effect of 
the position of trial within the 
episode on RT (and accuracy, in 
parenthesis)
Rule switch: main effect of rule switch (switch vs repeat trials). Rule switch × serial position: interaction 
between the effects of rule switch and serial position. Serial position × episode length: effect of serial posi-
tion compared across short and the first three trials of long episodes
Effect dfs F MSE p
Serial position (short) 2,52 28 (1.2) 163,851 (0.002) < 0.001 (0.3)
Rule switch (short) 1,26 119 (17.9) 544,179 (0.05) < 0.001 (< 0.001)
Rule switch × serial position (short) 2,52 18 (4.7) 51,458 (0.007) < 0.001 (0.01)
Serial position (long) 6,156 11 (2) 38,664 (0.004) < 0.001 (0.07)
Rule switch (long) 1,26 135 (16.2) 1,243,930 (0.09) < 0.001 (< 0.001)
Rule switch × serial position (long) 6,156 8.1 (1.4) 19,205 (0.002) < 0.001 (0.2)
Episode length 1,26 0.02 (1.3) 87 (0.003) 0.9 (0.3)
Serial position × episode length 2,52 6.1 (0.07) 3840 (0.4) < 0.01 (0.9)
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in spite of both consisting of three trials. Second, maintain-
ing programs related to longer episodes may require more 
cognitive reserves, causing a greater decrease in the amount 
of reserves available for individual trial execution during 
longer episodes. Consequently, not just trial 1 but subse-
quent RTs of 5-trial-short episodes will also be slower than 
the corresponding trials of 3-trial-short episodes. Note that 
such trials of 3-trial-long episodes could not be brought into 
this comparison, because these were preceded by a long iTi 
of 2 s, while those of 3 and 5-trial-short episodes followed 
immediately after the previous trial.
Methods
Stimuli and trial rules were identical to Experiment 1. The 
key differences in this experiment concerned iTis and the 
additional requirement to press a ‘task end’ button (key ‘Z’ 
on QWERTY keyboard) at the completion of each task epi-
sode. In 3-trial-short and 5-trial-short episodes, the stimuli 
for the next trial followed immediately after the response to 
the previous trial (Fig. 7a, b). Within 3-step-long episodes 
the onset of the next trial occurred 2 s after the response 
to the previous trial during which the monitor was blank 
(Fig. 7c). In all conditions there was a 2 s delay between 
the end of an episode and the beginning of the next, hence 
trial 1 of all task episodes was preceded by identical 
iTis. The experiment consisted of blocks made of 60 tri-
als. Nineteen Participants (11 females) completed 30–40 
blocks. Each of these blocks consisted of one of the three 
task episodes (i.e., 20 task episodes in 3-trial-short and 
3-trial-long blocks, and 12 task episodes in 5-trial-short 
blocks). The type of task episode to be executed in the 
block was cued by the instruction screen at the beginning 
of the block. Different task episode blocks were randomly 
interleaved with each other.
Results
As predicted trial 1 RT of 3-trial-long episodes was slower 
than trial 1 RT of 3-trial-short episodes [paired t18 = 2.9, 
p ≤ 0.01, 95% CI of difference = (17, 103), Cohen’s d = 0.67]. 
Thus, the magnitude of the episode-related program was 
Fig. 7  There were three kinds of blocks 3-trial-short, 5-trial-short and 
3-trial-long. iTi within an episode in the first two were 0 s and in the 
third 2  s. Inter-episode interval was 2  s in all conditions. To ensure 
that the trials were actively executed as one episode participants had 
to keep a count of trials they had executed and then press an addi-
tional ‘task end’ key at the completion of each episode. (Color figure 
online)
Table 11  Mean reaction times (ms) and accuracies (%) across the switch and repeat trials of the three task episodes
3-trial short 3-trial long 5-trial
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5
Sw 1090 ± 37
97 ± 0.6
947 ± 20
95 ± 1.2
979 ± 36
96 ± 1.1
1140 ± 45
97 ± 0.9
994 ± 30
96 ± 1.1
988 ± 30
96 ± 0.8
1144 ± 57
96 ± 1.3
1003 ± 26
97 ± 1.4
1012 ± 23
95 ± 1.2
1017 ± 30
96 ± 0.8
1039 ± 33
95 ± 1.1
Rp 1102 ± 34
94 ± 0.9
805 ± 30
97 ± 1.0
823 ± 25
97 ± 1.1
1140 ± 62
95 ± 1.1
928 ± 32
96 ± 0.8
939 ± 35
95 ± 1.1
1147 ± 61
94 ± 1.2
849 ± 37
97 ± 1.2
852 ± 31
98 ± 1.1
881 ± 30
98 ± 1.1
900 ± 21
97 ± 1.1
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affected not just by the number of constituent trials or steps 
but also by the temporal duration of the episode. Second, 
difference in RTs between 3-trial-short and 5-trial-short 
episodes was not limited to trial 1, instead RTs on all trials 
of 3-trial-short episodes was slower than the correspond-
ing trials of 5-trial-short episodes. Hence, the main effect 
of episode was significant (F1,18 = 10.5, p = 0.004) but its 
interaction with serial position was not (F2,36 = 0.4, p = 0.6), 
suggesting that maintaining larger program did decrease the 
amount of cognitive reserves available for trial execution. In 
other aspects results were identical to the previous experi-
ments (Tables 11 and 12).
General discussion
We showed that every time a series of otherwise independ-
ent and unpredictable trials was construed as a task episode 
(1) trial 1 had the longest RT, (2) which was longer before 
longer episodes, and (3) trial item-related switch cost was 
insignificant when the switch crossed construed episode 
boundaries. Results (1) and (2) showed that executing trial 
1 required additional processing that was related not to the 
intrinsic demands of trial 1 but to the construed episode 
begun by this trial, and suggested that some episode-related 
cognitive entity had to be assembled every time a task epi-
sode was to be executed, and the magnitude of this entity 
was larger for larger episodes. Result (3) suggested that this 
episode-related entity had a hierarchical relation with cog-
nitive configurations related to component trials, such that 
a change in this entity necessarily changed or ‘refreshed’ 
the trial-related configurations. As a result repeating and 
switching a trial type across episode boundaries became 
identical, i.e., in both cases trial-related configurations (e.g., 
trial-related set) had to be made afresh. We proposed that 
this entity was the program through which the task episode 
was executed as one entity.
The behavioral evidence of assembly of programs at epi-
sode beginnings provided by the current study is comple-
mented by the neuroimaging evidence of their dismantling 
at episode completions. Completion of action sequences, 
perceptual episodes as well as task episodes typically elicit 
additional activity (Farooqui et  al., 2012; Fox, Snyder, 
Barch, Gusnard, & Raichle, 2005; Fujii & Graybiel, 2003; 
Konishi, Donaldson, & Buckner, 2001; Zacks et al., 2001). 
This additional activity cannot be attributed to the intrinsic 
characteristics of the last event but only to the episode being 
completed (see Farooqui et al., 2012). Hence, for example, 
its magnitude and spread is affected by the hierarchical level 
of the episode completed (subtask < task).
If, as suggested by result (2) above, the program assem-
bled at the beginning contains elements related to the 
entire duration of the ensuing episode, then as the episode 
is executed elements related to the completed parts of the 
episode may dismantle. Consequently, the cognitive load 
related to the program will be highest at the beginning when 
the program related to the entire episode is active, and will 
decrease as more and more parts of the episode get executed. 
fMRI of experiments 2 and 3 (Farooqui, Duncan, & Manly, 
2018) showed that in neural regions known to deactivate in 
response to cognitive load (e.g., the Default Mode Network, 
Fox et al., 2005) beginning a task episode elicited a strong 
deactivation that then gradually decreased, with activity 
returning towards baseline, as sequential steps of the epi-
sode were executed.
One or more of the current observations have been made 
by previous studies in slightly different experimental con-
texts and interpreted differently. However, even those obser-
vations may be better explained by the thesis that all task 
episodes are subsumed and executed through programs. 
Execution of predictable sequences of trials across different 
studies has shown all of the three key results of the current 
study (e.g., Schneider & Logan, 2006, 2015). Though such 
studies frequently explain these in terms of the hierarchical 
nature of task-sequence representation in working memory. 
Table 12  Serial position: 
repeated measures ANOVA 
looking at the main effect of 
the position of trial within the 
episode on RT (and accuracy in 
parenthesis)
Rule switch: main effect of rule switch (switch vs repeat trials). Serial position × rule switch: interaction 
between the effects of rule switch and serial position
Effect dfs F MSE p
Serial position (three short) 2,36 25 (1.3) 553,841 (1.4) < 0.001 (0.3)
Rule switch (three short) 1,18 26 (0.2) 260,443 (0.2) < 0.001 (0.6)
Rule switch × serial position (three short) 2,36 20 (7) 82,326 (0.005) < 0.001 (0.002)
Serial position (three long) 2,36 40 (0.09) 397,508 (0.09) < 0.001 (0.9)
Rule switch (three long) 1,18 2 (1.3) 41,402 (1.3) 0.18 (0.3)
Rule switch × serial position (three long) 2,36 2 (0.4) 10,948 (0.4) 0.13 (0.7)
Serial position (five short) 4,72 25 (2.4) 318,429 (0.002) < 0.001 (0.06)
Rule switch (five short) 1,18 16 (4.5) 653,257 (0.006) 0.001 (0.04)
Rule switch × serial position (five short) 4,72 8 (3.4) 44,064 (0.003) < 0.001 (0.01)
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The presence of these very same observations in absence 
of such task-sequence representations suggests that these 
signs may be related to the execution of extended behav-
ior as one task entity and not, per se, to the task-sequence 
representations.
It may be claimed in this regard that the knowledge that 
the episode consists of 3 or 5 trials in the current study 
was the task-sequence representation. This, however, does 
not explain why trial 1 RT remained high even when the 
same episode was iteratively executed. It is unlikely that 
this knowledge and its corresponding representation was 
forgotten at the end of every episode and had to be recalled 
afresh for the next iteration. This view can also not explain 
why recalling that the episode will be long or consist of five 
trials take longer than recalling that episode will be short/
consist of three trials. Finally, this view can not explain why 
beginning a longer duration 3-trial episode take longer than 
beginning an identical 3-trial episode that is of shorter dura-
tion (experiment 6).
It can also be claimed that what are hierarchically stored 
in memory, and captured through constructs like tasks and 
goals, are not just linguistic representations, but include 
memories of past task and goal executions (e.g., Jacoby 
& Brooks, 1984; Logan, 1988; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; 
Neill, 1997). It is possible that instances of task execution 
generate a whole host of explicit and implicit/procedural 
memories (e.g., Jacoby & Brooks, 1984) organized around 
the goal (e.g., Logan, 1988), with re-execution strengthen-
ing the common elements across different iterations of the 
task episode executions and whittling away those that were 
specific to individual instances, thus creating memories 
of task execution. We agree with this account, and as we 
explain below, think that the execution of task episodes may 
occur by utilizing such past memories to assemble executive 
commands in a program for the current execution.
Another set of past studies have investigated what they 
call ‘restart cost’ using designs similar to that of experi-
ments 2 and 3 (e.g., Gopher et al., 2000; Mayr, Kuhns, & 
Hubbard, 2014; Poljac, Koch, & Bekkering, 2009; Wylie 
& Allport, 2000). In these studies small runs of trials (with 
shorter iTis) are separated by longer iTis. The RT on the trial 
following longer iTi was delayed and was interpreted as a 
‘restart’ cost. It was thought that the longer gap breaks the 
task item-related representations being maintained in WM, 
and the restart cost is related to the additional time taken to 
build these representations from long-term memory (Alt-
mann & Gray, 2002), or to the interference from various task 
item-related long-term memory traces during this working 
memory updating (Mayr et al., 2014).
Two results from the current study suggest that this 
‘restart cost’ may be related to the ensuing episode and not to 
the individual trial following the longer gap. First, this cost 
was related to the length of the task episode that ensued after 
the break (hence e.g., trial 1 RT for 5-trial episode > 3-trial 
episode), suggesting that what was assembled was not only 
related to the trial item being executed after the break, but 
to the larger task episode ensuing forth. Likewise, Poljac 
et al. (2009), noted that this cost was longer before more 
complex trial runs that had unpredictable trial rule switches 
compared to runs with predictable switches. Second, here in 
Experiment 1 there was no extended interval before the onset 
of each episode and yet ‘restart’ costs equivalent to those 
seen in Experiments 2 and 3 (where there was a gap) were 
observed. This suggested that it was the end of the conceived 
task episode, rather than the presence of a longer gap, that 
required a fresh assembly of cognitive entities. Plausibly, in 
the design of the ‘restart cost’ studies the period between 
two longer iTis became one task episode, and the ‘restart 
cost’ was related to the assembly of programs at the begin-
ning of these episodes.
In summary, the current and related studies (Farooqui 
et al., 2012, 2018) suggest that purposive behavior is exe-
cuted through programs related to the construed task and 
goal identities. These programs are assembled at the begin-
ning of task episode execution, manifesting in additional 
delays at the beginning of episodes. They contain elements 
related to the entire duration of the episode, hence longer 
times are needed to begin longer episodes. They subsume 
the execution of the task episode causing the cost of switch-
ing component task items to be present only within an epi-
sode and to be undetectable when such switch occurs across 
episode boundaries. These programs dismantle gradually as 
parts of the episode are executed causing gradual change in 
related activity across the duration of the episode (Farooqui 
et al., 2018). Completion of the episode dismantles them 
completely and elicits widespread activity (Farooqui et al., 
2012). Further insights into the content of such programs 
will have to await further studies, what follow are our cur-
rent speculations.
Relation to existing models of hierarchical behavior
Most attempts at modeling hierarchical behavior follow the 
assumption that execution of hierarchical behavior requires 
a parallel hierarchy of cognitive processing units (Cooper 
& Shallice, 2000; Estes, 1972; Norman & Shallice, 1986; 
Rumelhart & Norman, 1982). Typically, these models have 
discrete units for temporally smaller, lower level acts (e.g., 
‘pick spoon up’) which are activated by units corresponding 
to temporally longer, higher level acts (e.g., ‘add sugar from 
packet’), which in turn are activated by the unit related to 
the entire task/goal (e.g., ‘prepare coffee’). Such models, 
however, can only work for situations, where identity and 
position of component steps of the task are explicitly known. 
In addition, the deterministic relation between their higher 
and lower level units creates a problem for generalizing 
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actions across different task contexts as well as utilizing 
shared aspects of related actions. For example, across dif-
ferent coffee making situations sugar may be added before or 
after milk. Because the lower level acts making up the task 
of preparing coffee have fixed identities and ordinal posi-
tions, a small change such as this may require a totally dif-
ferent coffee making routine. In contrast to these models, the 
current study evidenced hierarchical cognition in situations, 
where higher level entities did not determine the identity and 
position of lower level steps.
Botvinick and Plaut (2004) suggested that a hierarchi-
cally organized processing system is not a prerequisite for 
hierarchical tasks. Instead, their model had perceptual input 
layer connected to the motor output layer through an internal 
hidden layer with recurrent connections between its compo-
nent units. This allowed the units of this layer to not only 
link the perceptual units to motor units but to also represent 
the current behavioral context generated by the previous 
step. This got integrated with incoming information from 
the perceptual layer to choose the correct context appropriate 
next step. Through practice, the model learnt to represent the 
sequential structure of the task in the patterns of activations 
across units of the internal layer.
Contrary to the predictions of this model, the current 
results suggested that even behavioral sequences that have 
no external hierarchical structure or pre-existing internal 
hierarchical task representations get hierarchically executed 
if those sequences are conceived as defined task entities. 
Because this model executes one step at a time, in absence 
of any entity that corresponds to the overarching task epi-
sode, it cannot predict long step 1 RTs that are longer before 
longer task episodes. Likewise, because processings related 
to individual steps are not subsumed by anything related to 
goal or task episode, this model is unlikely to show absent 
step-related switch costs at episode boundaries.
Programs
Existing accounts of cognition have proposed constructs like 
plans, scripts, schema and frames that subsume and control 
extended behavior but can be selected and instantiated as 
one entity (Cooper & Shallice, 2000; Miller et al., 1960; 
Minsky, 1974; Schank & Abelson, 1977). While the knowl-
edge of the identity and sequence of component steps is a 
requisite in these accounts, the current study suggested that 
even unpredictable task episodes, where such knowledge is 
absent, are executed through subsuming cognitive entities 
that correspond to extended behavior. Such entities may be 
better thought of as embodying the executive commands for 
organizing, controlling and executing task episodes, and not 
as mere representations of the steps to be executed.
Hierarchical instantiation of executive commands is well 
known in motor cognition (Henry & Rogers, 1960; Keele, 
Cohen, & Ivry, 1990; Rosenbaum et al., 1983; Rosenbaum, 
Cohen, Jax, Weiss, & van der Wel, 2007). Motor actions typ-
ically consist of a sequence of smaller acts, e.g., articulating 
a word may consist of a sequence of phonemic articulations. 
Instead of individually instantiating higher level executive 
commands for each of these component acts, a motor pro-
gram embodying the commands for the entire sequence is 
instantiated in one-go. This then unfolds across time into the 
seamless chain of small acts making up the overall action. 
While motor programs have typically been characterized 
in situations, where behavior seems to get executed bal-
listically, programs in general need not be limited to such 
instances.
When participants are given a memorized list to execute 
(e.g., CCSS, where C and S may, respectively, stand for 
color and shape decisions to be made across sequential tri-
als), such that only the sequence of task items to be executed 
across time, and not the actual sequence of motor acts to be 
made, is known in advance, the behavior evidences a cog-
nitive program, and not merely a recall of the sequence in 
working memory. Hence, not only is the item 1 RT high, it 
remains high even when the same sequence is iteratively exe-
cuted, suggesting that something additional has to be done to 
the sequence already in working memory. Furthermore, this 
item 1 RT correlates with the number of item-level switches 
in the sequence (e.g., Schneider & Logan, 2006; Desroch-
ers & Badre, 2015). Again, merely recalling a sequence like 
CSCS (with three item-level switches) need not take longer 
than a sequence like CCSS (with one item-level switch), 
but prospectively preparing for item switches to come may 
lead to longer item 1 RTs. The cognitive entity assembled at 
trial 1 thus embodies prospective control-related commands 
that will be needed during the ensuing episode, and has to 
be reassembled every time the episode has to be executed, 
even when the same episode is being iteratively executed.
Such programs related to memorized task-sequence 
execution did not directly translate into behavior, instead 
they translated into the sequence of rule-related cognitive 
set changes through which the correct motor act was selected 
in response to the stimuli (see discussion of Schneider & 
Logan, 2006). Analogously, the program in the current study 
could have translated into a sequence of control-related cog-
nitive changes that facilitated the search for the correct rule-
related cognitive set through which the correct motor act was 
subsequently selected.
The instantiation of attention and control is always linked 
to the goal in operation. Goals, typically, require some 
extended period of thought and behavior (i.e., task episodes) 
for their completion. It is possible that the executive com-
mands for instantiating the myriad higher level goal-related 
control changes in cognition for a task episode is executed 
in one-go. If, for example, the goal requires searching for 
visual targets across 20 s, the higher level commands that 
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instantiate the search and its related attentional changes in 
the brain need not be instantiated through separate com-
mands every millisecond or every second. It is possible that 
these may be achieved through a program that subsumes the 
search period bringing about relevant changes across time.
Every task episode requires organization of cognition 
across time. Various irrelevant processes and representa-
tions need to be cleared out and maintained in abeyance 
across time so that they don’t compete for cognitive reserves 
and disrupt task execution. Various task-relevant learnings, 
memories, skills, dispositions, knowledge and expectancies, 
and the corresponding configurational changes in various 
perceptual, attentional, mnemonic, and motor processes 
may be brought to fore (Bartlett, 1932; Logan & Gordon, 
2001; Mayr & Keele, 2000; Miller et al., 1960; Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995). The program may achieve these widespread 
changes across time. For example, in current task episodes 
processing related to mind-wandering, ongoing unconscious 
goals, task-irrelevant sensory and motor processing etc. had 
to be relegated. At the same time, the predictiveness of the 
episode was to be utilized to make anticipatory changes; 
e.g., knowledge that responses would be right handed, vis-
ual attention limited to area around fixation, along with an 
implicit idea of iTis, may have been used to increase prepa-
rations and attention at times when a stimulus was expected 
and decrease when iTi was expected.
Programs and routines in cognition
Entities that are selected and instantiated as one unit but 
correspond to a sequence of processes and actions have been 
proposed and evidenced in other domains. Ullman (1984) 
suggested that the immediate and effortless perception of 
spatial properties and relations of objects may be achieved 
through automatic instantiation of a visual routine—a fixed 
set of elemental processes on early visual representations 
(for a related construct see Sprites, Cavanagh, Labianca, & 
Thornton, 2001). Logan (1999) suggested that attention dur-
ing perceptual tasks be considered as a routine (attentional 
routine) consisting of the set of processes that intervene 
between perception and reaching a goal relevant proposi-
tional conclusion, e.g., during identification of object X this 
routine would intervene between early perceptual processes 
and the reaching of conscious conclusion that the ‘visible 
object is X’. Component motor acts of a larger motor action 
come about through a common program assembled at the 
beginning of execution (Henry & Rogers, 1960; Schmidt, 
1975). Fan et al. (2012) found that creating a means-ends 
relation between two sequential tasks created an additional 
delay in the execution of the first task, which they inter-
preted as related to the time taken by the supervisory con-
trol system in chaining subunits into longer goal-directed 
behavior (see also Sacker & Dehaene, 2009). Botvinick et al. 
(2009) proposed that extended sequence of behavior (e.g., 
‘open laptop’, ‘mouse to browser icon’, ‘double-click’, ‘enter 
URL’, among others) may be chunked into larger routines 
(‘check email’) through hierarchical reinforcement learning, 
wherein the reward signals strengthen the entire sequence of 
behavior, and not just one act, allowing instantiation of the 
entire sequence as a routine. In comparison, current results 
suggested that abstract, unpredictable, higher level sequen-
tial behavior can be executed as one-routine in absence 
means-ends relation and without receiving hierarchical 
reinforcing reward signals if that behavior is construed as 
one task entity.
We suggest that our phenomenal experience of execut-
ing task identities (e.g., ‘prepare breakfast’, ‘boil water’) as 
a whole, and not of individually executing its very many 
components, may be real (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). These 
typically correspond to an episode and consist of numerous 
sequential acts (‘prepare breakfast’, ‘boil water’). We suggest 
that our phenomenal experience of executing such task iden-
tities as a whole, and not of individually executing its very 
many components, may be real. At the beginning of task 
episodes we prepare for the entire episode as one unit. This 
preparation is embodied in a program. The actual contents 
of this program, and the prospective preparation it embodies, 
may depend on the familiarity and predictability of the task 
episode related to that goal. Completely predictable tasks 
may be prepared down to the level of individual motor acts 
to be made across time (e.g., Henry & Rogers, 1960; Rosen-
baum et al., 1983). During less predictable task episodes 
like memorized task-sequence execution the program may 
involve preparing for the sequence of stimulus—response 
rules to be applied across time (e.g., Schneider & Logan, 
2006). During unpredictable task episodes, the program may 
only instantiate goal-directed attention and other control pro-
cesses, and their related changes in cognition that enable the 
search for implementation strategies that will culminate in 
goal completion.
Conclusions
We showed that signs of hierarchical cognition, identical to 
that seen previously during the execution of memorized and 
predictable behavioral sequence, can be seen whenever any 
extended arbitrary segment of behavior is construed as one 
task episode, even when the components of that extended 
behavior are unknown and unpredictable. We suggest that 
task episodes, irrespective of the predictability of their com-
ponent steps, are executed through programs that are assem-
bled at the beginning and subsume and control the execution 
of the episode. We argue that these programs are the means 
of instantiating control across time and organizing cognition 
into goal-directed episodes.
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